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SLOUCHING TOWARDS EQUALITY· 
Christopher J. Peters ** 
In Equality as Uncertainty, I Joshua Sarnoff contributes helpfully to the on-
going (if intennittent) debate about the moral value of prescriptive equality and its 
implications for legal decisionmaking. But while Mr. Sarnoffs article fills some 
holes in our understanding of the impulse toward equal treatment, it also under-
scores the question that someone familiar with the recent legal-philosophical lit-
erature on the subject may be driven to ask: What's all the fuss about? 
That question arises from the fact that recent contributions to the debate about 
prescriptive equality, including Mr. Sarnoffs, seem largely to agree on the central 
proposition that Peter Westen first articulated in his well-known 1982 article on the 
subject2: Prescriptive equality is "empty," devoid of substantive moral content. My 
first goal in this brief reply to Mr. Sarnoffs article is to explain the source and 
extent of this agreement, with particular attention to the most recent law review 
commentaries-those of Mr. Sarnoff, Kent Greenawalt,3 and myself. Our agree-
ment covers vastly more ground than our disagreements. Indeed, our disagreements 
center not on the validity of prescriptive equality itself, but on the propriety and 
coherence of non egalitarian nonns of justice that might sometimes require "equal" 
treatment. 
My second goal will be to take up the most salient among these disagreements 
between Mr. Sarnoff and myself and to suggest some serious difficulties with Mr. 
Sarnoffs approaches to them. Mr. Sarnoffs "default" theory of prescriptive equal-
ity is of questionable efficacy even on its own tenns. It also, and more importantly, 
is deeply self-contradictory in that it simultaneously relies upon and denies the 
necessity of moral judgment. 
I. WHAT'S ALL THE Fuss ABOUT? 
In 1982, Peter Westen argued that the idea of prescriptive equality-equalityJ 
that is, conceived of as a moral directive-is tautological and thus morally empty. 
*Copyright © 1999 Christopher J. Peters. With apologies to Williarn Butler Yeats, The Second Coming 
("And what rough beast, its hour come round at last,lSlouches towards Bethlehem to be born?"), and 
ROBERT H. BORK, SLOUCHING TOWARDS GOMORRAH: MODERN LIBERALISM AND AMERICAN DECLINE 
(1996). 
** Assistant Professor of Law, Wayne State University Law School. As always, I thank my wife, Trish 
Webster, for her patience. 
1. Joshua D. Sarnoff, Equality as Uncertainty, 84 IOWA L. REv. 377 (1999). 
2. Peter Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 HARV. L. REv. 537 (1982). 
3. Kent Greenawalt, "Prescriptive Equality": Two Steps Fonvard, 110 HARV. L. REv. 1265 
(1997). 
4. The label "prescriptive equality" is, I believe, mine and not Professor Westen's. See Christo-
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Professor Westen defined prescriptive equality as "the proposition in law and mor-
als that 'people who are alike should be treated alike' .... ,,5 He pointed out that 
nonegalitarian moral principles are necessary to identify "people who are alike" in 
this formula: "People who are alike" necessarily becomes "people who are identi-
cally entitled (by nonegalitarian principles) to be treated in a certain way." For 
example, two students, X and Y, who both have scored 95% on a test are "alike" in 
that they are identically entitled to receive grades of A on the test. 
Once the phrase "people who are alike" is filled out by the nonegalitarian 
criteria used to determine "likeness," the tautological quality of prescriptive equal-
ity becomes evident: "People who are alike should be treated alike" becomes the 
truism "people who are identically entitled (by non egalitarian principles) to be 
treated in a certain way are identically entitled to be treated in that way." As ap-
plied to X and Y, for example, prescriptive equality demands only the already ob-
vious: Because X and Y, by virtue of each having scored 95% on the test, are iden-
tically entitled to receive As, then X and Yare identically entitled to receive As. 
Prescriptive equality, Professor Westen concluded, is unavoidably tautological and 
thus meaningless as a moral directive. 
The problem with Professor Westen's argument against prescriptive equality 
was that it overlooked the fullest expression of prescriptive equality, which is not in 
fact tautological. In two recent articles,6 I proposed a nontautological statement of 
prescriptive equality that I believe captures the normative force people often attrib-
ute to that principle. Prescriptive equality, I contended, is the principle that "people 
who are alike should be treated alike merely because they are alike"; or, as I 
phrased it in one article, "[i]dentically situated people are entitled to be treated 
identically merely because they are identically situated.,,7 Put differently-
viewed from an intermediate perspective, after one person already has been treated 
a certain way-prescriptive quality "is the principle that the bare fact that a person 
has been treated in a certain way is a reason in itself for treating another, identi--
cally situated person in the same way.,,8 
So stated, the principle of prescriptive equality is not tautological. After one 
fills out the criteria of "likeness" or "identical situation" using nonegalitarian 
norms, the principle of prescriptive equality provides yet another reason for equal 
treatment separate and apart from those nonegalitarian norms: the bare fact that the 
pher J. Peters, Equality Revisited, 110 HARV. L. REv. 1210, 1211, 1215 (1997) [hereinafter Peters, 
Equality Revisited]. 
5. Westen, supra note 2, at 539 (citations omitted). 
6. Peters, Equality Revisited, supra note 4, at 1222-27;. c;hristopher J. Peters, Foolish Consis-
tency: On Equality, Integrity, and Justice in Stare Decisis, 105 YALE LJ. 2031, 2062-64 (1996) [herein-
after Peters, Foolish Consistency]. 
7. Peters, Equality Revisited, supra note 4, at 1223. 
8. Id. Kenneth W. Simons articulated a similar nontautological principle of prescriptive equality 
in Equality as a Comparative Right, 65 B. U. L. REv. 387 (1985), but did not attempt to debunk it as I 
did in Equality Revisited. 
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people being treated are "alike" or "identically situated." As applied to the grading 
example, this nontautological principle of prescriptive equality tells us that students 
X and Y, each of whom scored 95% on the test, are identically entitled to receive 
As not only because each scored 95%, but also because each is identically situated 
to the other in the relevant respect. As such, giving student X an undeserved A + 
changes student Y's entitlement by giving us a reason (if not necessarily a decisive 
one) to gi¥e Y an undeserved A + as well. 
I have argued at length that even this nontautological statement of prescriptive 
equality is either morally empty or morally incoherent.9 If we have valid reasons 
for wanting to give Y an undeserved A+ after X has received one, they are reasons 
that have nothing to do with prescriptive equality-that is, reasons that do not rely 
upon the bare fact that two or more people are identically situated. Instead, they are 
reasons of nonegalitarian justice, which I have defined as the directive "that people 
be treated in accordance with the net effect of all the relevant (nonegalitarian) 
criteria and only the relevant (nonegalitarian) criteria.,,10 
As Mr. Samoffpoints out, this definition ofn6negalitarianjustice is heuristic, 
not substantive; it is "a formal cup of all non egalitarian norms into which is poured 
'an infinite variety of substantive moral conceptions of what criteria are "relevant" 
to a person's treatment in any given case.",l1 In other words, my "nonegalitarian 
justice" encompasses, and stands as a placeholder for, any and every moral norm 
except norms of prescriptive equality (that is, norms that require equal treatment 
because of the bare fact of identical situation). In a previous article, Equality Re-
visited,12 I attempted to demonstrate that one can trace every possible kind of 
(valid) reason for treating people "equally" solely to some conception of nonegali-
tarian justice rather than to prescriptive equality.13 
In a response to Equality Revisited, Kent Greenawalt contended "that the 
principle [of prescriptive equality] has force at least when two equals stand in some 
significant relationship to each other, and when the one who might receive worse 
treatment is aware that the other is an equal in relevant respects and has received 
better treatment.,,14 This force, Professor Greenawalt asserted, stems from "the 
desirability of satisfying feelings of affected persons that unequal treatment is in-
trinsically unfair.,,15 According to Professor Greenawalt, treating people equally is 
an "appropriate[] ... respons[e]" to such "deep-rooted feelings," which are "not 
easily dispelled.,,16 
9. Peters, Equality Revisited, supra note 4, at 1231-57; Peters, Foolish Consistency, supra note 6, 
at 2065-73. 
10 .. ' Peters, Equality Revisited, supra note 4, at 1228. 
11. Sarnoff, supra note 1, at 394 (quoting Peters, Equality Revisited, supra note 4, at 1229). 
12. Peters, Equality Revisited, supra note 4. 
13. Id. at 1231-57. 
14. Greenawalt, supra note 3, at 1266. 
15. Id. at 1273. 
16. Id. 
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Professor Greenawalt's defense of equal treatmeat, however, was not really a 
defense of the principle of prescriptive equality that I had attacked. Instead, it was 
an argument for treating people "equally" (or, at least, in ways perceived to be 
equal) for reasons of nonegalitarian justice-specifically the "appropriateness" of 
respecting people's "deep-rooted feelings" of unfairness when they suspect unequal 
treatment. 
As Professor Greenawalt contended, equal treatment might indeed be an ap-
propriate response to such feelings if undesirable consequences would result from 
not respecting them, consequences that outweigh any harm done by treating people 
wrongly in the name of equality. But this is not an argument of prescriptive equal-
ity, because it does not tum on the bare fact that the people involved are identically 
situated. (Indeed, it does not even require that the people involved are identically 
situated-only that one of them believes they are identically situated.) Only if the 
"deep-rooted feelings" of unfairness that counsel in favor of equal treatment can 
themselves be traced to valid norms of prescriptive equality is Professor Gre-
enawalt's argument a defense of prescriptive equality rather than merely a justifi-
cation for treating people "equally" for nonegalitarian reasons. But Professor Gre-
enawalt did not purport to establish such a linkage (and indeed my article was an 
attempt to demonstrate that the linkage does not exist). 
Professor Greenawalt, then, did not challenge the conclusion that prescriptive 
equality has no valid moral force of its own. Instead, he made the significant but 
different point that there may be good reasons of nonegalitarian justice for treating 
people equally. Mr. Sarnoff, in Equality as Uncertainty, appears to make the same 
general point, and to support it with a more extensive elaboration of essentially the 
same reasons for equal treatment suggested by Professor Greenawalt. 
Mr. Sarnoff conceives of equal treatment as a hedge against the risk of incor-
rect moral judgment. Moral judgment will always be a matter of uncertainty, Mr. 
Sarnoff points out, because "substantive morality is 'epistemologically' or 'meta-
physically' uncertain."J7 It is epistemologically uncertain because "we can never 
know all the relevant [moral] criteria [for treatment] and how they should be ap-
plied,,18; the dictates of morality, even if they exist, are unknowable. Morality also 
may be metaphysically uncertain if "there simply is no objective standard to deter-
mine the relevant criteria of justice,,19 -that is, if objective morality does not in 
fact exist (a question whose answer is itself unknowable). "In either instance," Mr. 
Sarnoff notes, "we cannot know whether and when we treat people justly in an 
absolute sense.,,20 
This fact of moral uncertainty, Mr. Sarnoff contends, makes it advisable to 
default to a rule of equal treatment in "situations where decisionmakers' [do not] 
17. Sarnoff, supra note 1, at 384. 
18. ld. 
19. ld. at 385. 
20. ld. 
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possess a high level of confidence in the morality of their judgmental criteria.,,21 
Because equal treatment is a "theoretical commitment[] deeply rooted in Western 
culture,,,22 unequal treatment often "appear[s] arbitrary,,23; those affected by it are 
likely to suspect that it "may be the result of errors of judgment or the application 
of improper criteria.,,24 Such suspicions, taken cumulatively, can have a damaging 
effect on the polity: 
As the frequency of apparent errors increases or the apparent relevance 
of the criteria decreases, we become more likely to view our institutions 
as unjust and thus unfit to impose treatment. At its most corrosive, pre-
scriptive equality [that is, the perception of unjustified unequal treat-
ment] may induce civil disobedience to institutional decisionmaking. 
Prescriptive equality thus also has a destabilizing effect on our legal 
doctrines and our legal system?5 
A default rule of equal treatment avoids or minimizes these undesirable ef-
fects by requiring "equal" (that is, the samei6 treatment of two or more seemingly 
similar people unless the decisionmaker "~ossess[es] a high level of confidence in 
the morality of [her] judgmental criteria" 7-unless, that is, the decisionmaker is 
reasonably sure that unequal treatment is the right thing to do. Defaulting to equal 
treatment in this way avoids the intuitive reaction against "unequal" treatment 
those disadvantaged by it are likely to experience. It thus also avoids the social 
harms that might arise if enough people come to believe that legal or political deci-
sionmakers are regularly treating them unfairly. 
In Part II, I discuss some troubling difficulties with this argument. For present 
purposes, however, it is enough to note that Mr. Sarnoffs defense of what he calls 
"prescriptive equality,,28 is not in fact a defense of that principle at all; rather, like 
Professor Greenawalt's, it is an argument in favor of equal treatment for nonegali-
tarian reasons. Indeed, one can view Mr. Sarnoffs analysis as a more deeply theo-
rized version of Professor Greenawalt's argument. 
Professor Greenawalt suggested that equal application of an incorrect treat-
ment might be appropriate in certain circumstances as a response to deeply held 
21. Id. at 381. 
22. Sarnoff, supra note 1, at 390. 
23. Id. at 383. 
24. Id. at 382. 
25. Id. 
26. Giving the same treatment to two people might not be seen as treating them "equally" ifin fact 
the two people are not equally entitled to that treatment 
27. Sarnoff, supra note 1, at 381. 
28. Mr. Sarnoff's definition of "prescriptive equality" is revealing: He "use[s) the phrase ... to 
refer to the normative demand/or equaltreatmenl, however expressed." Id. at 378-79 (emphasis added). 
"Prescriptive equality" for Mr. Sarnoff thus includes norms of non egalitarian justice as I have defined it, 
see supra notes 10-11 and accompanying text, and is not limited to the directive that likes be treated 
alike merely because of their likeness. 
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"feelings of affected persons that unequal treatment is intrinsically unfair,,,29 feel-
ings that "usually cannot be dispelled by 'explanation.",3o Mr. Sarnoff provides a 
reason why such feelings often cannot be explained away: The fact of moral un-
certainty prevents decisionmakers from demonstrating convincingly that the criteria 
upon which they base unequal treatment are morally correct. Those disadvantaged 
by unequal treatment will always have room to suspect that their disadvantage is 
"the result of errors of judgment or the application of improper criteria.,,31 In other 
words, they will believe that they are being treated unjustly. This suspicion can be 
avoided only in "situations where decisionmakers possess a high level ofcconfi-
dence in the morality of their [decisions],,32 (and where this confidence can con-
vincingly be transposed to those bearing the brunt of unequal treatment). 
This "default" theory of equal treatment is entirely a theory of nonegalitarian 
justice and not at all a theory of prescriptive equality as I have used that term. This 
is so for the same reasons that Professor Greenawalt's approach does not rely upon 
prescriptive equality. Placating people's feelings of unjustified "unequal" treatment 
often may be a good idea, to avoid adverse consequences like loss of respect for 
government and, eventually, civil disobedience. But this is not an egalitarian rea-
son for equal treatment; it is not a reason grounded in the bare fact of likeness be-
tween or among two or more people. Again, only if one can trace the feelings being 
placated to valid norms of prescriptive equality is the conclusion of that principle's 
emptiness called into question. But Mr. Sarnoff, like Professor Greenawalt, does 
not provide such a connection, and does not attempt to provide one. 
Like Professor Greenawalt, Mr. Sarnoff makes only an argument for equal 
treatment, not an argument for prescriptive equality. He does not provide reasons 
for treating people unjustly in order to treat them equally; instead, he provides an 
account of why the fact of moral uncertainty may change what it means to treat 
people justly. This is a thought-provoking argument, but it is not a defense of pre-
scriptive equality. 
What, then, is all the fuss about? Not much, if the subject of the fuss is pre-
scriptive equality. Mr. Sarnoff, Professor Greenawalt, and I all seem to agree that 
prescriptive equality-the directive to treat likes alike merely because they are 
alike-has no moral validity. Mr. Sarnoff and Professor Greenawalt, however, 
offer reasons aside from prescriptive equality for requiring equal treatment. It is to 
these reasons that I now tum, focusing on Mr. Sarnoff's more extensive elucidation 
of them. 
29. Greenawalt, supra note 3, at 1273. 
30. [d. 
31. Sarnoff, supra note I, at 382. 
32. [d. at 381. 
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II. EQUALITY AS A DEFAULT RULE 
, 
As Part I explains, Mr. Sarnoff believes that the fact of moral uncertainty re-
quires imposition of equal treatment as a default rule, operative unless a decision-
maker "Rosses[es] a high level of confidence in the morality of [her] judgmental 
criteria.,,33 Like all default rules, the requirement of equal treatment can also be 
seen as a presumption in favor of equal treatment, "var[ying] in direct proportion to 
the significance of our decisions, and in inverse proportion to our confidence in 
judgment.,,34 At some point, a decision becomes so insignificant, or the decision-
maker's confidence becomes so strong, or both, that the presumption against equal 
treatment is overcome. Short of that point, the decisionmaker must apply equal 
treatment. 
There are two general categories of difficulty with this approach. First are lin-
gering questions about whether defaulting to equal treatment, assuming the logical 
coherence of doing so, actually is likely to serve the salutary purposes Mr. Sarnoff 
attributes to it. Second is the incoherence of grounding equal treatment in the fact 
of moral uncertainty, and the implication of that incoherence: that moral uncer-
tainty, while counseling humility in making judgments, cannot be a reason for re-
fusin& to make them. 
A. WHY EQUALITY? 
One might be tempted to ask why equal treatment is the default rule Mr. Sar-
noff proposes in the absence of reasonable moral certainty. Why not unequal 
treatment? Why not treatment by coin-flip? 
Mr. Sarnoff never exhaustively answers this question, perhaps because he 
thinks the answer is self-evident. But he at least suggests two kinds of answers, one 
that he defends at some length and another at which he only hints. I discuss each 
here in tum. 
1. The Argument from Effects 
As I suggest in Part I, Mr. Sarnoff's primary justification for defaulting !o 
equality appears to tum on the "theoretical commitment" to equal treatment that is 
"deeply rooted in Western culture.,,35 This cultural commitment to equal treatment 
triggers an intuitively negative reaction whenever two seemingly equal people are 
treated unequally; a suspicion arises that the unequal treatment is "the result of 
errors of judgment or the application of improper criteria.,,36 Because morality is 
33. Id. 
34. Id. at 380. 
35. Id at 390. Mr. Sarnoff notes that "[0 ]ther cultures ... may not possess this commitment to 
equality and against arbitrariness, or may not adhere to it with equal force." Id at 391. 
36. Sarnoff, supra note 1, at 382. 
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inherently uncertain, such suspicions often cannot be satisfactorily explained away. 
The result can be "a destabilizing effect on our legal doctrines and our legal sys-
tem.,,37 
The core problem with this analysis is that equal treatment may produce the 
same suspicions and feelings of resentment that unequal treatment may produce-
and indeed may pose further threats to the stability of the social order. Let me illus-
trate this point with an example from my own experience?8 
In grading essay examinations in most of my law school courses, I use a 
rather complex system in which I specify the issues and arguments I want the stu-
dents to address and assign a certain point value to each issue or argument. I also 
award extra credit for issues or arguments raised by students that I did not identify. 
After grading each essay question, I add up the student's total score using a spread-
sheet program. When I have graded all the exams, I assign letter grades according 
to my law school's mandatory grading curve. 
Obviously, there is a good deal of room for discretion, even error, in this 
grading process. Although the exams I grade are anonymous, I can never be sure 
that I gave the ninetieth student the same amount of credit for a particular issue that 
I gave the twentieth. I can never be sure that my standards for awarding extra credit 
are exactly the same for each student. I can never be sure that the cutoff point be-
tween A-minuses and B-pluses is the best one. Uncertainty lurks at every stage of 
the procedure. 
Recognizing this uncertainty, I often agonize over the need to make fine dis-
tinctions between students. One student, X, has a total score of 90.00 out of 100 
points; another, Y, has a total score of 89.75. The 90.00 would be an A- on the 
curve, the 89.75 a B+. How can I differentiate between the two students on the 
strength, or weakness, of one quarter of a point? Perhaps I made an error in grading 
one or both of the two exams; perhaps I should have given Y credit for an addi-
tional quarter of a point; perhaps I should not have given X credit for that amount. 
Perhaps the line between an A- and a B+ is arbitrary and unfair. There are many 
grounds for lack of confidence in my judgment. 
Faced with this uncertainty, I may be tempted simply to give both students the 
same grade. Note, however, the two ways in which I could accomplish this equal 
treatment. I could lower X's grade to a B+, despite her apparent desert of an A-. Or 
I could raise V's grade to an A-, despite his apparent desert of a B+. 
First, imagine what might happen if I choose the former altemative-Iower-
37. ld. 
38. Mr. Sarnoff may be pleased to note that this example incorporates the fact of moral uncertainty 
rather than "assum[ing] away all uncertainty regarding the criteria for judgment" as I have done in 
previous examples. ld. Of course, Mr. Sarnoff's objection to "assuming away uncertainty" has force 
only if the fact of moral uncertainty coherently can generate an argument for equal treatment; as I ex-
plain below, it cannot. (In fact, even if moral uncertainty could generate an argument for equal treat-
ment, it does not follow that moral uncertainty can generate an argument for prescriptive equality, 
which was the subject of the examples to which Mr. Sarnoff adverts.) 
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ing X's grade to match V's. If I do so, it is difficult to see how I have avoided the 
same sorts of negative reactions that might have been produced had I maintained 
the distinction between the two students. If X discovers that her grade has been 
lowered in the name of "equal treatment" with Y, she seems quite likely to protest 
that her revised Eade is "the result of errors of judgment or the application of im-
proper criteria.' The same sense of justice that might be offended by differential 
treatment of the two students on the uneasy basis of a qua.rter-point difference 
surely will be offended-perhaps more so-by identical treatment of the same two 
students in the face of that difference. 
The larger point here is that moral uncertainty not only implies the impossi-
bility of conclusively demonstrating the correctness of moral judgments; it also 
implies the impossibility of conclusively demonstrating their incorrectness. As 
such, a person who is disadvantaged by a decisionmaker's reliance on a particular 
moral judgment, like Y if he gets a B+ instead of an A-, will always have grounds 
to complain that the basis of that judgment was incorrect, or at least not certain 
enough to support disadvantaging him. By the same token, a person who is disad-
vantaged by a decisionmaker's refusal to rely on a particular moral judgment, like 
X if her grade is lowered to a B+, will always have grounds to complain that the 
basis of that judgment was correct and thus should have been acted upon. The par-
ticular form of equal treatment that involves giving someone less than she deserves 
will produce the same grounds for complaint as unequal treatment. 
What, then, ifI choose the second alternative: raising V's grade to match X's? 
Now X cannot complain that she did not get what she deserves. Or can she? Stu-
dent X's grade of A- is rendered less valuable by the fact that Y now has the same 
grade; grades, at least in classes with mandatory curves, are valuable as compara-
tive rather than absolute measurements of achievement. The greater the number of 
students who receive A-minuses, the more diluted the value of each A- becomes. If 
every student got an A-, then there would be no point in having one. By awarding 
Y an undeserved A-, I will have harmed X's interest in preserving the full value of 
her deserved A-. X will have grounds for complaint after all. 
One can generalize this point across instances of what I have called "condi-
tions of competition,,40 -cases in which there is not enough of a particular good to 
go around.41 In such conditions, distributing goods (like prestigious grades) to 
those who do not deserve them in the name of "equal treatment" harms those who 
do deserve such goods by reducing the amount of goods available to them. Of 
39. Id. at 382. 
40. Peters, Equality Revisited, supra note 4, at 1232. 
41. Actually, 1 define "conditions of competition" in Peters, supra note 4, Equality Revisited, at 
1232 as conditions in which there is not enough of a particular good to go around among those equally 
entitled to it. The definition usefully can be broadened for present purposes, however, to include condi-
tions in which there is competition for scarce goods among anyone who wants them, whether or not the 
competitors are equally entitled to those goods. 
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course, a decisionmaker may not be confident of her ability to distinguish between 
those who deserve a particular good and those who do not. But, again, the fact of 
this moral uncertainty gives X as much basis to complain about the dilution of her 
A- as Y has to complain about his B+. The "remedy" of equal treatment does not 
solve the problem of complaint. 
It may be, of course, that not all treatment decisions involve competitive re-
sources like the grading example does; in some cases there may be enough of a 
particular good for everybody, deserving or not. Let me suggest, however, that 
cases involving infinite resources will be relatively few and far between, and that 
the cases we care about most will almost always involve scarce resources of one 
form or another. If a resource is in infinite supply-like, perhaps, personal well-
being or happiness42-then we tend to assume that everyone has an equal entitle-
ment to it, and we do not distinguish between or among people for purposes of 
distributing it. Only when there is not enough of a good to go around do we care 
about dividing it up, and about making distinctions that allow us to do so. If this is 
true, then in most cases achieving equal treatment by giving someone something he 
does not deserve will in fact give others grounds for complaint. 
But there is an even more fundamental point lurking here. Suppose the addi-
tion of one more student to the ranks of the A-minuses will not appreciably dilute 
the value of X's grade. X still has grounds to complain about the raising of V's 
grade-not for the reason that the two students have been treated equally, but for 
the reason that they have been treated unequally. X, after all, has been given the 
grade that she (and I) believe she deserves; she has not been given the benefit of a 
boost to a higher grade. But Y has been given this benefit-despite the complete 
lack of evidence that he is more entitled to it than X. Y has been given a better 
grade than (I believe) he deserves; X has not. The two students have been treated 
unequally, to X's detriment. 
In other words, equal treatment of two people who may not deserve to be 
treated equally according to one standard necessarily amounts to unequal treatment 
of two people who may deserve to be treated equally according to another standard. 
If moral uncertainty demands equal treatment in one respect, how can it justify 
unequal treatment in another? This conundrum reflects the core difficulty with Mr. 
Sarnoff's derivation of a presumption of equal treatment from the premise of moral 
uncertainty, and I discuss it further in section II.B. 
There is yet another reason to question the efficacy of achieving equal treat-
ment by giving people benefits they do not deserve: Doing so often causes other 
problems that may be no less threatening to the stability of the social order than 
perceived inequities in treatment. If my colleagues and I decide to compensate for 
the inherent uncertainty of our grading system and adopt a practice of giving eve-
42. To say that personal well-being is in "infinite supply" is not to say that everyone in the real 
world actually can obtain it-only that it is not logically impossible for everyone in the real world 
actually to obtain it. 
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ryone the highest grade that our law school's rather loose grading policies will 
allow, several results may occur. One result will be the graduation, with decent 
grades, of some students who will not be competent lawyers. These lawyers' cli-
ents, and the legal system itself, will suffer for their incompetence. Perhaps worse, 
public perceptions of the effectiveness of the legal system will slowly be eroded as 
more and more incompetent lawyers fmd their way into practice. Even if few in-
competent lawyers actually make it into practice, the public per~eption that "{:very-
one gets As and Bs" in law school may lead to a conclusion of widespread incom-
petence. Some citizens will be inclined to take the law into their own hands, or to 
disobey the laws emanating from what they believe to be an ineffective system. 
Farfetched? Perhaps, but no more so than the similar consequences Mr. Sar-
noff warns may arise from widespread perceptions of unjustified unequal treat-
ment.43 If intuitive feelings of injustice may be triggered when seemingly equal 
people are treated unequally, then intuitive feelings of injustice also may be trig-
gered when seemingly undeserving people are treated the same as seemingly de-
serving ones. Mere equality of treatment is no remedy. 
2. The Argument from Epistemic Asymmetry 
In Equality as Uncertainty, Mr. Sarnoff hints at another justification for de-
faulting to equality of treatment. He acknowledges that "imposing equal treatment 
may also be arbitrary and capricious by failing to make iPpropriate distinctions 
based on the relevant criteria or their proper application." However, he asserts, 
the fact of moral uncertainty means "[t]here is ... no countervailing force for pre-
scriptive inequality.,,45 Thus, default to equal rather than unequal treatment is ap-
propriate. 
Exactly what argument Mr. Sarnoff means to invoke by this conclusion is un-
clear; he does not go into more detail, and the only authority he cites is a large 
range of pages from a 1985 article by Kenneth Simons.46 Professor Simons's arti-
cle suggests that Mr. Sarnoff may have in mind what I will call an argument from 
epistemic asymmetry. 
At one point in the page range cited by Mr. Sarnoff, Professor Simons asserts: 
[I]t is not surprising that, as Greenawalt concludes, "people usually feel 
a more acute resentment when those they deem equal are treated better 
than they are (e.g., given a higher salary) than when those they feel are 
relevantly less deserving are treated equally (e.g., given the same sal-
43. See Sarnoff, supra note 1, at 382 ("At its most corrosive, prescriptive equality may induce 
civil disobedience to institutional decisionmaking."); id. at 398-400 (discussing the risk of civil disobe-
dience when widespread unequal treatment is perceived). 
44. [d. at 389 (emphasis in original). 
45. [d. (emphasis in original). 
46. [d. at 389 nn.39-40 (citing Simons, supra note 8, at 437-59). 
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ary)." It is much easier to conclude that another is roughly as deserving 
as you than to estimate how much less deserving he is. And if you are 
equally deserving, the prescribed treatment is simply equality of the 
relevant benefits. By contrast, even if you are confident that another is 
less deserving, you may not be confident about how much less he de-
serves.47 
If this is the passage Mr. Sarnoff means to invoke, then Mr. Sarnoffs argument 
here for default to equality of treatment is something like the following: It is epis-
temically easier to determine that, as a matter of nonegalitarian justice, two or more 
people are roughly equally entitled to a particular treatment than to determine ex-
actly in what degree they are unequally entitled to that treatment. (For example, it 
is easier to conclude that two employees are both entitled to roughly the same sal-
ary than to determine exactly how much more one employee should be paid than 
the other.) In this way, equal treatment and unequal treatment are epistemically 
asymmetrical; it is easier to settle on a satisfactory equal treatment than on satis-
factory unequal treatments. Thus the default rule in cases of uncertainty should be 
equality of treatment-which can be accomplished by simply giving each em-
ployee the same salary-rather than inequality of treatment, which requires the 
(epistemically more difficult) procedure of determining exactly how much more to 
pay one employee than the other. 
This argument, however, is deficient on two levels. First, it is wrong as a 
matter of epistemology. I will stick with Professor Simons's (actually Professor 
Greenawalt's) salary example for the sake of consistency. Suppose a manager must 
determine what salary to pay each of two newly hired employees, X and Y. Epis-
temically, it is no easier for the manager to determine that both employees are enti-
tled to a salary of $50,000, for example, than to determine that X is entitled to 
$60,000 and Y is entitled to $40,000. In the cases of both X and Y, the manager 
will have to independently perform the epistemic tasks of reviewing qualifications, 
assessing work experience, evaluating policies and precedents, etc. to determine the 
appropriate salary. It is not as if performing these tasks with "respect to X gives the 
manager license to avoid performing them with respect to Y and to simply give Y 
the same salary by default. Nor is there something magical about arriving at the 
same salary figure for both employees that retroactively reduces the amount of 
epistemic work that was necessary to get there with respect to each of them. 
It is true, of course, that the epistemic difficulty of the manager's task might 
be reduced if she decides beforehand simply to give both new employees the same 
salary. Then she can determine what one of them deserves and simply give them 
both that amount. But this is no better an argument for defaulting to equal treatment 
than it is for defaulting to treatment by coin-flip. Determining both employees' 
47. Simons, supra note 8, at 443 (citing Kent Greenawalt, HolY Empty Is the Idea of Equality?, 83 
COLUM. L. REv. 1167, 1175 (1983». 
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salaries completely at random would expend no epistemic effort at all; and yet it is 
fairly clear that neither Mr. Sarnoff nor Professor Simons would advocate random 
chance as the default decisionmaking mode in the face of epistemic difficulty. Nor, 
I suspect, would either of them claim that epistemic difficulty justifies always 
treating everybody the same with respect to every treatment-paying every em-
ployee the same salary, for instance, with no inquiry into desert, or giving the same 
. welfare benefits to everyone who asks for them, without inquiring abeut need. 
In short, the argument from epistemic asymmetry either proves too much, or it 
proves nothing at all. It proves too much if it holds that the difficulty of making a 
separate assessment of desert with respect to each individual justifies eschewing 
such an assessment altogether and simply always treating everyone the same-a 
remedy that no one reasonably could advocate. But without this kind of prescrip-
tive force, the argument proves nothing at all, because the possibility of equal 
treatment cannot relieve the decisionmaker of the need to make a separate assess-
ment of desert with respect to each individual. 
The argument from epistemic asymmetry also is wrong in a second respect: It 
reflects two category errors, failing to distinguish between crucially different kinds, 
and between crucially different degrees, of epistemic moral uncertainty. The argu-
ment assumes a case in which a decisionmaker is epistemically uncertain not only 
about how two or more people should be treated differently, but about whether 
those people should be treated differently at all. For instance, the argument assumes 
that the manager not only is unsure about how much more to pay X than Y, but 
even about whether X deserves more money than Y in the first place-or whether, 
instead, X and Y both deserve to be paid the same. 
In fact, however, there will be many cases in which a decisionmaker is quite 
confident that two or more people deserve different treatment, but lacks confidence 
about exactly how their treatments should differ. For example, the manager might 
be confident that X deserves a higher salary than Y by virtue of her greater experi-
ence; but the manager might be unsure about how much more to pay X than Y. 
These two kinds of cases are crucially distinct. In the fonner kind of case, de-
faulting to equal treatment by paying X and Y the same salary will not clearly do 
injustice to either employee-because there are no clear grounds to argue that ei-
ther employee is being paid more or less than he or she deserves. X cannot point to 
Y and say, "I know that I deserve a higher salary than he does (and I know that 
you, the manager, know this), and yet we are being paid the same. Either I'm get-
ting less than I deserve, or Y is getting more than he deserves." The epistemic un-
certainty about whether the two employees are entitled to the same salary renders 
default to equal treatment unobjectionable. 
In the latter kind of case, however, defaulting to equal treatment by paying X 
and Y the same salary clearly does injustice to at least one employee. Now X can 
point to Y and make her complaint: "I know that I deserve a higher salary than he 
does (and I know that you, the manager, know this), and yet we are being paid the 
.' 
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same. Either I'm getting less than I deserve, or Y is getting more than he deserves." 
In this case, the existence of epistemic uncertainty does not preclude reasonable 
objections to default to equal treatment; the uncertainty goes to just how different 
the treatments of X and Y should be, not to whether they should be different at all. 
The argument from epistemic uncertainty elides this second type of case, an 
omission subtly revealed in Professor Simon's statement "It is much easier to con-
clude that another is roughly as deserving as you than to estimate how much less 
deserving he is.,,48 Even if this statement is true, it does not imply that it is always 
easier to conclude that another is roughly as deserving as you than to conclude that 
another is more or less deserving than you to some degree. In any case in which it 
is relatively "easy" to conclude--or, more accurately, in which there are reasonable 
grounds to believe and thus to argue-that one person deserves better treatment 
than another (even if the degree of "better" treatment is uncertain), defaulting to 
equal treatment will give that person cause to complain that an injustice has been 
done. In such a case, defaulting to equal treatment does nothing to avoid the unde-
sirable effects that concern Mr. Sarnoff and that I discuss in section II.A.I. 
As the foregoing discussion suggests, the argument from epistemic asymme-
try also commits a second category error which compounds the first: failure to 
distinguish between different degrees of epistemic moral uncertainty. The argu-
ment assumes that the epistemic uncertainty facing the decisionmaker is com-
plete-that the decisionmaker not only is ultimately uncertain about whether to 
treat two or more people differently, but has no valid grounds whatsoever upon 
which to base a decision to treat them differently. The decisionmaker is, in the 
vernacular of the day, utterly clueless. For instance, the argument assumes that the 
manager not only cannot decide whether X should be paid more than Y, but does 
not even possess any valid indicia upon which to base such a decision-no em-
ployment histories, educational qualifications, personal attributes, or the like to 
compare (or, if these things exist, no grounds for determining that they make one 
employee more deserving than the other). There is, in short, nothing the manager 
can reasonably point to if required to justify a decision to pay X more than Y. 
In the real world, however, many (perhaps most) cases will be nothing like 
this. In many or most cases, there will be some reed, however slim, upon which to 
hang a decision to treat one person differently from another. In many or most cases, 
employee X will have slightly more work experience than employee Y, or slightly 
better grades in school, or a slightly more winning personality. Of course, none of 
these differences may be sufficiently compelling to convince the manager that she 
is justified in paying X more than Y. But the presence of reasons about which a 
decisionmaker is unsure is crucially different than the complete absence of reasons. 
As long as there is some reasonable basis for distinguishing between X and Y, X 
will have grounds to complain if she is treated no better than Y. X, for instance, 
48. [d. 
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will be able to point to her higher grades in college and complain that she is being 
treated unjustly by being given the same salary as Y (even though neither she nor 
the manager is certain whether she is being treated unjustly). Again, in such cases, 
defaulting to equal treatment fails to avoid the undesirable effects with which Mr. 
Sarnoff is concemed.49 
We are left, then, with what seems a fairly narrow category of cases in which 
tIle argument from epistemic asymmetry, even on its own teFms, mig.'It have some 
sting: cases in which there are absolutely no reasonable grounds to determine 
whether one person should be treated better than another. In such cases, it does 
indeed seem reasonable to require that both people be treated the same.50 To de-
scribe this requirement as one of "defaulting to equality," however, or as a "pre-
sumption of equal treatment," would be to ignore causes and focus solely on ef-
fects-something like describing the survivors of the Titanic as having decided to 
tour the North Atlantic by lifeboat. In fact, the reason X and Y should be tr~ated the 
same if there are no reasonable grounds to distinguish between them is that any 
differential treatment would, by definition, reflect one or more irrelevant criteria 
and thus would be wrong according to nonegalitarian justice. Equality of treatment 
is merely the byproduct of nonegalitarian justice-of treating each of X and Y as 
he or she deserves to be treated.sr 
B. THE NECESSITY OF JUDGMENT 
Taken to its extreme, Mr. Samoffs argument from moral uncertainty proves 
far more than he, or anyone else, is likely to find palatable. Moral uncertainty in-
fects every moral decision; it is not as if some moral precepts are objectively, con-
clusively knowable and others are not. The moral correctness of every judgment is 
open to question. If equal treatment is the appropriate response to moral uncer-
tainty-if, as Mr. Sarnoff asserts, '~rescriptive equality has force in all situations 
where moral judgment is required" 2-then every decisionmaker facing the possi-
49. This kind of case-in which there are at least some reasonable grounds for treating one person 
better than another, despite uncertainty about those grounds-includes the exam grading example I 
introduced in section II.A.!, supra. In that example, the grader is epistemically uncertain about the 
validity and accuracy of his grading process, and thus about the validity and accuracy of giving the 
student with a 90.00 an A- and the student with an 89.75 only a B+. But because there are some reason-
able grounds for treating the students differently, student X with her 90.00 can complain about being 
treated unjustly if both she and student Y, with his 89.75, are given the same grade. The presence of 
(partial) epistemic uncertainty does not eliminate the reasonable basis for complaint upon default to 
equal treatment 
50. Professor Simons seems to have this narrow category of cases in mind when he refers to a 
"presumption of eqUality"; he cites approvingly Professor Greenawalt's "suggest[ion] that a presump-
tion of equality is appropriate when there are no reasons to treat persons unequally." Simons, supra note 
8, at 457 (emphasis altered). 
51. For a full explanation of why this is so, see Peters, Equality Revisited, supra note 4, at 1231-
57. 
52. Sarnoff, supra note 1, at 380. 
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bility of distinguishing between or among people must a/ways default to equal 
treatment. Equality of treatment becomes the universal, not just the default, rule. 
This is not Mr. Sarnoff's conclusion, of course. Instead, Mr. Sarnoff postu-
lates a "tipping point of confidence in judgment;"S3 prior to the tipping point (that 
is, when the decisionmaker's confidence in her judgment is not strong enough) the 
decisionmaker defaults to equal treatment, while beyond it (when her confidence in 
her judgment is strong enough) she may treat people "unequally." "The force of 
equality varies ... in inverse proportion to our confidence in judgment."s4 
The salient characteristic of this "tipping point" solution is its paradoxical re-
quirement of certain, or at least "confident," moral judgment. How is a decision-
maker to determine whether, and when, her moral judgment is certain enough to 
support unequal treatment? She can only make this determination by making a sort 
of "meta-judgment"-a moral judgment about the certainty of her moral judgment. 
But if morality is inherently uncertain, how can the decisionmaker be confident in 
the accuracy of her meta-judgment about the accuracy of her first-order judgment? 
Must she make a third-order judgment-a meta-meta-judgment-about the accu-
racy of her meta-judgment? If so, how can she be confident in the accuracy of her 
third-order judgment? By making a fourth-order judgment? And so on. The prob-
lem is one of infinite regress. 
The core difficulty of which this problem is a symptom is this: Once one pro-
ceeds from the fact of moral uncertainty to a presumption against exercising moral 
judgment, one has stopped playing the game of moral argument altogether. One has 
conceded that there are no rules by which that game can be played. Accordingly, 
one has estopped oneself from appealing to such nonexistent rules. 
Mr. Sarnoff, however, frequently appeals to the rules of moral judgment that 
he claims do not exist. His reluctance to extend equal treatment to every case of 
decisionmaking uncertainty-that is, to every case-and his consequent invocation 
of a "tipping point" of moral certainty, with its inevitable moral judgment about 
moral judgments, is one example. 
Another example is the very premise of his argument: that "equal" treatment 
is a coherent option in the absence of moral certainty. Here the problem lies in the 
fact that achieving equality of treatment requires making moral judgments about 
the relevant standards of "equality." Consider again the exam grading example. 
Moral uncertainty (of a sort) infects my judgment that student Y, with a score of 
89.75 on his exam, deserves a B+ while student X, with a score of 90.00, deserves 
an A-. If I decide to respond to this uncertainty by treating both students equally, 
however, I come up against the necessity of making new, similarly uncertain moral 
judgments. What amounts to "equal" treatment with respect to these two students? 
Is merely giving them the same grade sufficient to achieve "equality"? Or should I 
53. [d. at 403. 
54. [d. at 380. 
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take other factors into account: for instance, the fact that student Y has gotten 
straight As in all his other courses (thus making it unlikely that a single B+ will do 
him much harm) while student X has gotten Cs in all her other courses (thus mak-
ing her A- all the more important to her)? Should I account for the fact that X is 
independently wealthy (and thus doesn't really need a job in the legal profession) 
while Y is laboring under the weight of tens of thousands of dollars in student 
loans? That X is a nicer person than Y? That Y is a member of a minority group 
that is underrepresented in the legal profession? 
Indeed, how do I know that X and Y are the students I should be comparing? 
Why not compare X with Z, who scored 88.75? If! lack confidence in the moral 
correctness of giving a B+ to Y, with his 89.75, am I that much more confident that 
Z deserves a B+ with a score that is only a point lower? Indeed, why not compare 
X with W, who scored only a 66.50 but who, I happen to know from reliable 
sources, studied harder than anyone else in the class? Or with V, who scored 70.00 
but wants to become a public interest lawyer? 
And suppose I settle on a comparison between X and Y and decide to raise 
V's grade to an A-. I still am presented with the problem, mentioned in section 
II.A. I above, that treating Y equally to X with respect to his grade means treating 
him better than X with respect to the benefit of having his grade raised. Why is this 
inequality not the one I should worry about perpetrating? By the same token, why 
shouldn't I worry about treating Y unequally in comparison to Z, whose B+ has not 
been raised to an A-? 
The point of all this, of course, is that the decision to "default" to equal treat-
ment is itself fraught with moral judgments. There is no more certainty with respect 
to these moral judgments than there is with respect to those supporting unequal 
treatment. Equality of treatment is no alternative to moral uncertainty; it is simply 
another vehicle for it. 
Mr. Samoffs enterprise, then, is at war with itself. It can justify a presump-
tion of equal treatment only as a response to the inherent uncertainty infecting 
nonegalitarian moral judgments. But the same uncertainty infects egalitarian moral 
judgments. We are left with no reason to prefer the (dubious) pursuit of equality 
over the (dubious) pursuit of other forms of justice. 
CONCLUSION 
Perhaps the most surprising feature of Mr. Samoffs article Equality as Un-
certainty is that, despite its billing, it is not about prescriptive equality at all. Mr. 
Sarnoff does not argue that prescriptive equality-the command to treat likes alike 
merely because they are alike-has any substantive moral force. Instead, he argues 
that there are other reasons, nonegalitarian reasons, for a presumption of equal 
treatment. 
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But Mr. Sarnoff's other reasons collapse into themselves. Moral uncertainty 
cannot be a reason for equal treatment, because moral uncertainty pervades at-
tempts to achieve equal treatment just as it suffuses attempts to justify unequal 
treatment. Ifnonegalitarianjustice is uncertain, equality is no less so. 
There is a message here, I think. The message is that moral judgment is in-
evitable, even-perhaps especially-in a world of moral uncertainty. If the dictates 
of morality were written down somewhere, morality would be simply a matter of 
interpretation, and we might be justifiably reluctant to act without tracing our ac-
tions directly to the letter of the moral law. But morality is not written down, and so 
we are denied the luxury of deferring to some universal text. Instead, we have to 
make moral judgments as best we can-humbled but not deterred by the recogni-
tion of our own fallibility. 
If so, equal treatment is not an alternative to the exercise of moral judgment. 
It is a function of that exercise, just as unequal treatment is. No purpose is served 
by slouching towards equality reluctantly, as if there were no other choice. Better 
to stride there firmly, or to stride firmly in the other direction. 
